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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
14591

-vsSTEVEN CRAIG TURNER,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE Of THE CASE
Appellant appeals from th^ judgment of the
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, whict
found him guilty by a jury trial of Iviolation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1953), as amerided.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On April 14 and 15, 1976, appellant was tried
and convicted of aggravated robbery in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1953), a^ amended.

He was

sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate
term of five years to life in prison,
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent petitions the Court to affirm
the conviction of appellant by a jury in the lower court,

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 22, 197 5, Jerry Graham was robbed at
Dan's Foodtown at 70th South and Highland Drive, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah.

On July 22, 1975, appellant

was cirrested in connection with the robbery, identified
by Mr. Graham as the assailant and on July 23, 1975,
a complaint was filed accusing the appellant of
aggravated robbery in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-302 (1953), as amended in 1975.

Trial by jury

was held on April 14 and 15, 1976. After presentation
of all the evidence, the following six instructions,
among others, were given to the jury:
"Instruction No. 8: Under the
law of the State of Utah, robbery is
the unlawful and intentional taking of
personal property in the possession of
another from his or her person, or
immediate presence, against the will
of that person, which taking is
accomplished by means of force or
fear.
A person commits an aggravated
robbery, which is a first degree felony,
if, in the course of committing a
robbery, that person uses a deadly
weapon. A deadly weapon means anything
that in the manner of its use or
intended use is likely to cause death
or serious bodily injury.
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Under the law, ^n act of using
a deadly weapon is deemed to be 'in the
course of committing a robbery,f as
that phrase is used in these instructions,
if the use of a deadly weapon occurs in an
attempt to commit, orf during the commission
of a robbery.
I
One acts 'unlawfully1 in the taking
of personal property in the possession of
another, as used in t^hese instructions
if the actor takes such property wrongfully, without rights or permission and
with the deliberate i|ntent to commit a
crime.
J
Under the law, one acts intentionally
or with intent with respect to the nature
of his conduct or as a result of his conduct
when it is his conscious objective or desire
to engage in the conduct or to cause the
result.
|
Intent with which an act is done
denotes a state of mind and connotes
purpose in so acting. Intent, being a
state of mind, is noti always susceptible
of proof by direct ana positive evidence and
may ordinarily be inferred from acts,
conduct, statements a^id circumstances."
"Instruction No.i 9: You are instructed
that a firearm is not a deadly weapon unless
it is loaded. The Ut$h Code defines when
a weapon is deemed to have been loaded in
76-10-502, but if froijn the evidence you have
a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the
gun testified to in tlfiis case was loaded,
you must find the defendant not guilty of
aggravated robbery anc^ consider the lesser
included offense of rdbbery."
"Instruction No. 10: You are instructed
that for the purposes of this case, that a
'dangerous weapon1 me^ns any item that in
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the manner of its use or intended
use is capable of causing death or
serious bodily injury. In construing
whether an item, object or thing not
commonly known as a dangerous weapon
is a dangerous weapon, the character
of the instrument, object or thing;
the character of the wound produced, if
any; and the manner in which the instrument, object, or thing was used shall be
determinative.
'Firearms' means pistols, revolvers,
sawed-off rifle and/or any device that
could be used as a weapon from which
is expelled a projective by any force."
"Instruction No, 11: You are
instructed that facsimile is defined as:
An exact and precise copy of anything.
An exact reproduction, for example, the
signature reproduced by rubber stamp."
"Instruction No. 12: You are further
instructed that a facsimile of a firearm
is any instrument that by its appearance
resembles a firearm*"
"Instruction No. 13: Before you can
convict the defendant of the crime of
aggravated robbery, as charged in the
Information, you must find from the evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following
elements of that crime:
1. That on or about the 22nd day of
July, 197 5, in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, the defendant, Steven Craig Turner,
unlawfully and intentionally took money or
property from Jerry Graham.
2. That said property or money was
in the possession or immediate presence
of Jerry Graham.
3. That the taking of said money or
property from Jerry Graham was accomplished
by means of force or fear.
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4. That in the course of taking
said money or property the defendant,
Steven Craig Turner, 'used a deadly
weapon consisting of a firearm or
a facsimile of a firdarm.
If you belive tljat the evidence
establishes each and all of the
essential elements of the offense beyond
a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to
On the other
convict the defendant
hand, if the evidence has failed to so
establish one or more of said elements
then you should find the defendant not
guilty of aggravated robbery and then
consider the lesser included offense
of robbery in accordance with the
following instruction."
Closing arguments were then heard and the jury
began its deliberation.

After the jury had left the

courtroom time was granted by the beptch to except to the
instructions.

The State indicated it had no objections.

Appellant objected to the above recited instructions (T.123124) on the grounds that the instructions were confusing and
conflicting and further objected to the statute as being
unconstitutionally vague.
POINT I
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-302 (1953), AS AMENDED IN
1975, IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGU$ AS APPLIED TO
APPELLANT IN THIS CASE.
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1953), as amended,
insofar as is pertinent to the case at bar, reads as
follows:
"(1) A person commits aggravated
robbery if in the course of committing
robbery he:
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile
of a firearm, knife or a facsimile of a
knife or a deadly weapon."
The complaint under which appellant was charged
and convicted reads:
"That the said Steven Craig Turner
at the time and place aforesaid, robbed
Jerry Graham, and in so doing, used a
deadly weapon, to wit: a gun or facsimile
thereof." (R.8).
Appellant contends that the court, in attempting
to instruct the jury on the meaning of the word "facsimile,"
did so in a manner as to render Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302
(1953), as amended, unconstitutionally vague as applied to
appellant in this case.

The Utah Supreme Court has spoken

on more than one occasion to the matter of unconstitutional
vagueness of statutory law.

As has been the case for many

years in Utah, there is a very strong presumption in favor
of the validity of legislative enactments, and where possible,
the Supreme Court must uphold the validity of an act rather
than declare it unconstitutional.

Tygreen v. Magna Water

Co., et al., 119 Utah 274, 226 P.2d 127 (1950); Greaves

v. State, 528 P.2d 805 (1974).

The feeling of the court

has been that only where it is impossible to resolve
doubts will an act be declared invalid for uncertainty
or vagueness.

Tygreen, supra; Nowers v. Oakdeny 110 Utah

25, 169 P.2d 108 (1946).

The test for uncertainty or

vagueness was enunciated succinctly in State v. Packard,
122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561 (1952).

The Court, in declaring

the criminal statute involved unconstitutional, set forth
guidelines to be followed:
"Concerning the question of
uncertainty or vagueness of statutes,
the authorities seem to be in accord
that the test a statute must meet to
be valid is: It must be sufficiently
definite (a) to inform persons of
ordinary intelligence/ who would be
law abiding, what th^ir conduct must
be to conform to its requirements;
(b) to advise a defendant accused of
violating it just what constitutes
the offense with which he is charged,
and (c) to be susceptible of uniform
interpretation and application by those
charged with responsibility of applying
and enforcing it."
This test was adhered to and reaffirlmed in Greaves v.
States, supra»
In the case at bar, appelljant seemingly is not
challenging the validity of Section 76-6-302, per se, but
is challenging the statute as applied to him in his trial
after the trial judge, via jury instructions, defined the
word "facsimile."

It should be noted that appellant did
-7-

not offer an alternative definition to the one given
by the court in Instuction 11. The Court, in defining
"facsimile" in Instruction 11, apparently consulted
Ballentine's Law Dictionary for reference, since as
appellant states, there is very little in the way of
legal dissertation on the precise meaning of the word
per se,

in a legal sense.

This is understandable,

however, for it would seem that the word "facsimile,"
speaking in a legal sense, is a non-technical rather than
a technical word, and as such, there would be little
occasion for legal interpretation.

However, since the

word appears in not only the challenged statute, but in the
complaint, the trial judge correctly instructed the jury
as to the meaning to be given such a "non-technical" word
used in a "technical" (legal) sense.

Failure to have

done so could have resulted in error. McBride v. Woods,
124 Colo. 384, 391, 238 P.2d 183 (1951); Lucas v. Michigan
C.R. Co., 98 Mich. 1, 56 N.W. 1039 (1893).
The word facsimile appears in Ballentine's
Law Dictionary, Third Edition, as follows:
"Facsimile. An exact and precise
copy of anything. An exact reproduction,
for example, the signature reproduced by
rubber stamp." 11 Am.Jur.2d B. & W. §
210.
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This definition coincides! verbatim with that
given in Instruction No. 11.
In his brief, appellant gives us the benefit of
other definitions and synonyms of the word in question.
Websters New Unabridged Dictionary, | Section Edition,
gives the following definition:
"1. Act of making a copy,
imitation.
2. An exact aikd detailed
copy of anything, as of a book,
document, painting, or statute.
Syn. See duplicate." (Emphasis
added.)
Funk and Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English
Language gives the following definition of "facsimile:"
"An exact copy or reproduction;
a perfect imitation of a work of art,
manuscript, engraving, coin, stamp,
medal or other original; in a loose
sense, an exact model or counterpart.
Syn.: see Duplicate; model."
Case law produces a definition for the word
"imitation" in the case of People v. Delgardo, 14 6 N.Y.S.2d
350, 356; 1 Misc.2d 821 (1955):
"The word •imitation1 when applied
to pistols and revolvers means so nearly
resembling the genuine as to mislead,
with the apparent object of producing,
and likely to produce, upon the minds of
those against whom it is to be used, the
belief that the imitation weapon is capable
of producing all the injurious consequences
to the victim as the use of the genuine
article itself." (Emphasis added.)
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Now that an "arsenal" of definitions of the
word "facsimile" has been established, both in a nonlegal (Websters; Funk and Wagnalls) and legal sense
(Ballentine's, Black), what is the meaning of "facsimile"?
What did the legislature have in mind when enacting
Section 76-6-302, specifically using the phrase " . . .
(a) uses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm. . . . "?
(Emphasis added.)

Certainly any of the definitions

mentioned, including the one given by the trial judge
in Instruction No. 11, would suffice.

The test to use

in the interpretation of a word or phrase in a statute
has been set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in
State v. Packard, supra, at 375:
"The limitations of language are
such that neither absolute exactitude of
expression nor complete precision of
meaning are to be expected, and such
standard cannot be required. On the
other hand there is no disagreement
among the courts that where a rule is
set up, the violation of which subjects
one to criminal punishment, the
restrictions upon conduct should be
described with sufficient certainty,
so that persons of ordinary intelligence,
desiring to obey the law, may know how
to govern themselves in conformity with it,
and that no one should be compelled at
the peril of life, liberty or property,
to speculate as to the meaning of penal
statutes."
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This test was reiterated by the Supreme Court
of Utah once again in Greaves v. Stpte, supra at 807.
Speaking to a complaint that the criminal statute
involved was void for vagueness, the court said:
11

. • . the presumption of validity
hereinabovestated#giVes rise to the
rule that a statute V i H not be declared
unconstitutional for that reason (vagueness) if under any sensible interpretation
of its language it cfcn be given practical
effect. The requirement is that it must
be sufficiently clear and definite to
inform persons of ordinary intelligence
what their conduct must be to conform to
its requirements and to advise one accused
of violating it what constitutes the offense
with which he is changed." (Emphasis
added.)
In the Greaves case, supr^ at 806f the Court also
laid down the test to be used in th^ judicial determination
of the constitutionality of statute^:
"In regard to tfye judicial
determination of the constitutionality
of statutes there ar^ certain principles
relating to statutory construction, to
be taken into consideration. Because
the duty rests upon tihe court to determine
the scope of the powers of all three
branches of government, they have a
special responsibility to exercise a high
degree of caution and restraint to keep
themselves within the limitations of the
judicial power in order not to infringe
upon the prerogatives of the executive
or the legislative branches. In harmony
with that policy it i|s the well-established
rule that legislative enactments are
endowded with a strong presumption of
validity; and that thjey should not be
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declared unconstitutional if there
is any reasonable basis upon which they
can be found to come within the
constititutional framework; and that
a statute will not be stricken down
as being unconstitutional unless it
appears to be so beyond a reasonable
doubt." (Emphasis added.)
There are several questions to be answered in
determining as to whether this "reasonable doubt test"
and the test enunciated in State v. Packard, supra, have
been met.

Is there really a reasonable doubt in the minds

of men of ordinary intelligence as to what the legislature
meant when it enacted a law (Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302
(1953), as amended in 1975) prohibiting the use of a "firearm or a facsimile of a firearm" in the commission of a
robbery?

Was there a reasonble doubt in appellant's mind,

when he committed this robbery, as to what conduct was
prohibited by the statute?

Was there really

a reasonable

doubt in the minds of the jury members as to what the
meaning of the word "facsimile" and the phrase "facsimile
of a firearm" meant?

Respondent respectfully sbumits that

the answers to the questions propounded are succinctly in
the negative.
It would seem after careful reading of the
various definitions of "facsimile," and after reading
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People v. Delgardo, supra, that the word "facsimile" is
synonymous with "imitation," "duplicate," "resemblance,"
etc., and that this is what the legislature had in mind
when enacting the statute, as did the court when giving
Instruction Nos. 11 and 12.

It would also seem appropriate

to conclude that appellant was put on fair notice that if
he committed a robbery by use of an actual firearm or
something that resembled or was the imitation of a firearm
he would have to answer to the people of the State of Utah
for violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1953) , as amended
in 1975.
Apparently appellant would have this Court take
the view that "facsimile of a firearm" be construed through
the eyes of the criminal, rather th4n through the eyes of the
victim or the eyes of the jury.

As was so adequately expressed

in People v. Delgardo, supra, the purpose of the use of an
"imitation" or "facsimile of a pistol" is ". . .to produce,
upon the minds of those against whom it is to be used, the
belief that the imitation weapon is capable of producing
all the injurious consequences to the victim as the use of the
genuine article itself."

Certainly this is the thought the

legislature had in mind when drafting Section 7 6-6-302.
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Certainly the evidence in the case at bar bears out the
fact that the victim believed the appellant to have
been armed with a pistol, whether or not the object
was in fact a pistol (T.10 and T. 22) .
"Q. Now, you indicated
you saw about an inch and a
half of a gun pointing out of a
shirt, is that what you stated?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Would you explain to me
what you mean pointing out of his
shirt?
A. He had his hand under the
barrell, was just up under his shirt.
All I could see of the shirt down over
it was an inch and a half of the
barrell.
Q. Sure it wasnft a piece of
pipe?
A.

I don't believe it to be, no."

Clearly it can be seen that the victim believed
the object pointing out of appellant's shirt to be a gun
of some sort.

Whether or not it was actually a gun or

not is immaterial*

The important criteria, according

to the statute, is that the object must have in fact been a
firearm (pistol) or so closely resemble a firearm (facsimile
of a pistol) as to induce belief on behalf of the victim
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that the object was in fact a fireairm.

This does

not seem as complicated as appellant would have
this Court believe. If appellant's theory is
followed, those persons such as appellant who
desire to participate in activity s^ich as
robbery will now be able to reap the lucrative
fruits of an aggravated robbery while only
being required to pay the price of $. simple
lesser included offense of robbery, by the
use of something which, though it resembled
a firearm, was not the precise, exacpt, dimension
by dimension replica of the firearm appellant had
in mind.

Certainly this is not the thinking

behind the statute, and certainly such an
interpretation could not and was not given to
Instructions 11 and 12, either individually or
collectively.
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Instruction 11, when read with Instruction 12,
does not open up a "vast area of definition and interpretation," but merely gives the jury the definition to
be followed while exercising its function, i.e., to
determine whether or not the object used in the robbery,
based upon the evidence given, was in fact a firearm
or a facsimile thereof.

If in fact the jury found

appellant guilty of aggravated robbery on the theory
that a facsimile of a firearm was used, the jury was
required to find as fact that the instrument used so
exactly and precisely resembled a firearm so as to
actually be mistaken for such a weapon.

This is in

essence what Instructions 11 and 12, when read together,
mean.
Appellant's contention that Instructions 12
and 9, when read together, compound the vagueness of the
statute is wholly without foundation.

A careful exam-

ination of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1953), as amended
in 19 75, reveals that there are several modes by which
aggravated robbery can be committed.

One is by use of

a firearm, another by use of a facsimile or an imitation
of a firearm.

The complaint charges that the crime was

committed by the use of a deadly weapon, to wit:
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a gun

or facsimile thereof.

Instruction 9 sets out the

requirements to be met in order for a gun to be classified as a deadly weapon, should the jury find that as a
matter of fact that a real gun was ujsed.

Instruction 12

sets forth the definition of a "facsimile of a firearm",
which instruction of course would bel used should the jury
find that a real gun was not used.

jThus, Instructions

9 and 12 are absolutely necessary in order for the jury
to make a finding based on the evidence set forth and
the statute under which appellant wafe charged.

No

conflict or vagueness exists; if anything, a marvelous
job of clarification.
Appellant concludes his argument in Point I
of his brief by submitting that the c^bject used could
have been "a three-inch piece of rubber tubing painted
grey, grey plastic tubing or any number of things that
are neither deadly or dangerous and $till appellant
could have been convicted of aggravated robbery."

According

to the terms of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1953), as
amended in 1975, if "three-inch rubber tubing painted
grey", or "grey plastic tubing" was ^o designed as to give
one, particularly Mr. Jerry Graham, the victim, the
belief or fear that an actual gun was being directed
at him, and if the jury found as a matter of fact that
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such tubing so closely resembled an actual firearm
as to give the very appearance of one, then appellant
could have been convicted of aggravated robbery, and
rightLy so.

On the other hand, the jury may have

found that a real firearm was used, and that it was
loaded.

If so, appellant could have been convicted of

aggravated robbery, and rightly so.

In either case,

Instructions 9, 11, and 12 were all very necessary for
the jury deliberation.

The jury had many decisions

to make, among which were to find as a matter of fact
whether or not the object used was a firearm, whether
or not it was loaded if it was a firearm, if the object
was not a firearm, did it so closely resemble a firearm
by its exactness and resemblance so as to give the victim
the appearance of being an actual firearm.

These matters

are all within the province of the jury, and as such the
jury must be instructed thereon.

People v. McKinney,

111 Cal. App. 2d 690, 245 P.2d 24 (1952); State v.
Chisholm, 7 Wash. App. 279, 499 P.2d 81 (1972); Hutton
v. People, 156 Colo. 334, 398 P.2d 973 (1965); State
v. Faulkner, 5 N.C. App. 113, 168 S.E.2d 9 (1969).
of the above cases dealt

Each

with the issue of whether or

not it was the function of the jury to determine whether
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or not an object used was an actual firearm or an
imitation, whether or not such firearm, if real, was
loaded, and whether or not the object used was a
dangerous or deadly weapon within the confines of the
statutes involved.
Respondent submits that the Instructions given
by the trial court did not change the meaning of the
statute so as to leave it vague or uncertain, but
merely explained the various elementls of the offense
with which appellant was charged and further defined
certain "technical" (legally speaking) words which were
necessary to arrive at a just verdict, based upon the
evidence presented.

Specifically, Instruction 11

defined "facsimile" as taken from a Jreliable legal
source; the term "facsimile" was used in Instruction
12, thus the need for Instruction 11,

Based upon

Instruction 11, Instruction 12 couldj read:

"You are

further instructed that an exact or precise copy, or
imitation of a firearm is any instrument that by its
appearance resembles a firearm."

Thps the need for

both instructions - they compliment <pne another.

They

must be read together and taken as a whole, as was
expressed by this court in State v. ^uerts, 11 Utah 2d
345 at 352, 359 P.2d 12 (1961):
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"This also can be said, adroit
counsel may dissent an instruction,
and by attempting to hang the whole
case on separate parts thereof, make
a plausible argument that error was
committed. But when the instructions
are considered as a whole, and in light
of the evidence and the particular
charges lodged against the defendant,
as they should be, there is no doubt
that the jury was clearly and
accurately advised of specific charges.
Such is the case at bar.

Appellant has in

reality attempted to "dissent" each instruction separately,
concluding that there are contradictions therein, while
at the same time proceeding under the guise of argument
that the Instructions, when read together, are such as
to render the statute vague.

When read together, the

Instructions make clear the evidence needed in order for
appellant to be convicted under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302
(1953), as amended in 1975.

The statute is clear as to

the conduct prohibited, both to the citizen of ordinary
intelligence who desires to obey the law, and to the
citizen of ordinary intelligence who desires to disobey
the law.

Proof of a reasonable doubt has not been sub-

mitted to show that the statute was vague as applied to
plaintiff.

Greaves v. State, supra.
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POINT II

'

THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE DISTRICT COURT
Ai-.L .,

• •.•;; i-.v ': ,C AND CONTRADICTORY.
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A-. Evermore, *ve tic- •: >: believe

appellant is in •> position to complain

about the use 01

words, as it was at his invitation."

Such was the case

in State v. Stewart, supra, where the defendant offered
an instruction, which was accepted by the court and
given.

The defendant then claimed error in giving of

the instruction.

The court flatly dismissed such an

argument by simply declaring, "Prepared instruction
No. 9 was given.

Defendant cannot claim error when

one of his offered instructions is given".
the case at bar.

Such is

Appellant offered Instruction No.

10, and he cannot claim error because of an allegation
of conflict with Instruction 8.
there is no

Be that as it may,

conflict between the two instructions,

as logic infers in the earlier explanation.
Appellant further argues that Instructions
8, 9, 10, 12, and 13 are all conflicting and leave the
jury with at least five possible methods of convicting,
all contradictory.

Such is not the case when the

Instructions, which should be considered together, are
considered as a whole.

State v. Hendricks, 123 Utah

267,, 258 P.2d 453 (1951).

Instruction 8 sets forth

the elements necessary to prove in order to convict
of robbery or aggravated robbery.

It specifies that a

deadly weapon must be used to convict of aggravated
robbery and further defines what a deadly weapon consists
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of

the
• •'

ui

riiir

appeal, states:
"4. That in the course of
taking said money or property the
defendant, Steven Craig Turner,
used a deadly weapon consisting
of a firearm or a facsimile of a
firearm."
This Instruction apprises the jury of the fact that
before they can find appellant guilty of aggravated
robbery, they must first find one of two things:

(1)

that Steven Craig Turner, the appellant, used a deadly
weapon consisting of a firearm (in which case, according
to Instruction 9, the firearm must be found to be
loaded); or (2) that Steven Craig Turner used a facsimile
of a firearm (thus the need for Instructions 11 and 12).
This is precisely what the statute prohibits, and is
precisely what the appellant is charged with.
It is true that the language in paragraph 2
of Instruction 8, in which it is said that one committing
robbery by the use of a deadly weapon commits aggravated
robbery, is narrower than that used in the statute;
for the statute precludes not only the use of a deadly
weapon, but the use of a firearm or a facsimile of a
firearm, a knife or facsimile of a knife.

However,

Instructions 9, 11, and 12 cover the meaning of firearm
and facsimile of a firearm.
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"Thus, a defendant may be charged
with committing a single crime in
two or more ways and proof of one
will uphold the indictment or information. But before the jury
can be instructed on and allowed to
consider the various ways of committing
the crime alleged, there must be
sufficient evidence to support the
instructions. Moreover, the instructions must clearly distinguish
the alternative theories and require
the necessity for a unanimous verdict
on either of the alternatives. When
such is the case, the prosecutor need
not be forced to elect, for fear that
half of the jury will find the defendant
guilty on one theory and half on
another theory."
The State of Utah alleged that the appellant
committed robbery, and in so doing used a deadly weapon
consisting of a firearm, or, in the

alternative, used

a facsimile of a firearm, which would not be a deadly
weapon; however, Utah Code Ami. § 76-6-302 (1953), as
amended in 19 75, does not require that a deadly weapon
be used in order for one to be convicted of aggravated
robbery.

The requirement is met if a facsimile of a

firearm is used.

The requirement is met if a genuine

firearm is used.

The complaint is clear in that it

alleges that either a deadly weapon, specifically a gun,
was used; or, in the alternative, a facsimile of a
deadly weapon, consisting, specifically, of a facsimile
of a gun.
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Appellant
was prohibited.
jury so found.

was pci
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can bo found.

For !!•'• • casor.s stated, respondent: respectfully request:' -;-^ - f^ ; :iov-v; - 1 '
coi iviction rendered
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Respect r ul i y suhr.itted,
ROBERT i>. ii^^^r,..
Attorney General
A • i.i.i.i^i . . . .-iKKETT
^ssistanl Attornev nc-nm
Attorneys for Respondent
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